Trump’s return to power: How does the European Union intend to respond?
The aggressiveness of the United States in a context of intertwining economies
Since his return to power in January 2025, Donald Trump and his government have triggered multiple instances of outrage and coercive measures on an international scale and in particular vis-à-vis countries or regional organisations previously considered as allies: Canada, Mexico, Ukraine and of course the European Union (EU). Apart from the words and the abandonment of the rhetoric of human rights – which the West has held dear for three decades – to legitimise its interference and interventions on a global scale, the United States wants to engage in a real economic war, including with its “partners”.
While the strategy of the world’s leading power is changing, the stakes remain the same: a desire for economic recovery in a context of scarcity of resources and rare earths and to maintain its hegemony at a time when the Western camp is increasingly being challenged by the countries of the South and where new powers such as China are on the offensive.This is all the more alarming for the European Union, as its economy is totally linked to that of the United States. The intertwining of trade and industrial policies between the two entities has even strengthened since the renewal of the transatlantic partnership in 2021. In addition, the joint statement from the second EU-US summit on 20 October 2023, which emphasises the further consolidation of this “cooperation to address the pressing challenges and emerging opportunities of our time, in terms of strengthening our economic security, promoting reliable, sustainable, affordable and secure energy transitions, both within our economies and globally, strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation, and harnessing digital technologies“[1].
With regard to economic cooperation, the objective is then “a targeted agreement on critical minerals, aimed at expanding access to sustainable, safe and diversified supply chains of critical minerals and high-quality batteries” with the aim of creating a large “Western club of critical raw materials” bringing together the United States, the EU and their allies by pooling risks in supply chains. This “solidarity” of an alliance without limits on exports was at that time seen as a counterweight to the “risk of a Chinese monopoly“[2].
Since then, this alliance has been profoundly challenged by the Trump administration’s desire to impose drastic tariffs on its “allies”, but also by aggressive operations to get its hands on rare earths and critical materials. As such, here are three illustrative examples:
- The imminent agreement to grant 50% of Ukraine’s rare earths to the United States in exchange for the continuity of their military support, when about 5% of all the world’s “critical raw materials” are in Ukraine,[3] and the EU also has an interest in benefiting from these resources[4].
- The US administration’s attempts to buy Greenland. In addition to the fact that this autonomous territory of Denmark would be a geopolitical asset, it has rare earth resources estimated at 36.1 million tonnes (Mt) by the National Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), the island has a significant stock of these 17 metals coveted by the industry of tomorrow. In November 2023, the EU signed a strategic partnership on raw materials[5].
- The decree signed by Donald Trump on 24 April 2025 allowing the large-scale extraction of minerals in the deep ocean, including in international waters. This measure, contrary to international law, would allow the United States to recover resources such as copper, nickel, cobalt or manganese, used in particular in the production of batteries, wind turbines and photovoltaic panels.
This issue of rare earths as critical metals and materials is at the heart of the problem of economic and industrial recovery. They are essential for the manufacture of components present in many pieces of military and digital equipment. It should be recalled that, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the EU’s demand for minerals would have to quadruple in order to meet the needs of industry and the digital transition, and increase sixfold to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. By then, European demand for cobalt is expected to increase by 331% and that for nickel by 103%. But it is lithium that should be the most coveted, with European consumption expected to increase from 23,000 tonnes in 2020, from 100,000 to 300,000 tonnes in 2030, depending on the speed of the ecological transition, and from 700,000 to 860,000 tonnes in 2050[6].
The US’s shift to seeing the European Union as a competitor rather than an ally could therefore have dramatic consequences for the economy of the old continent[7]. In March 2025, L’Humanité magazine ran the headline “Will Europe leave history behind?“»[8].
The astonishment of European governments, between alignment and contradictions
However, in the face of this unprecedented threat, both the European Commission and the governments of the Member States are unable to respond in a united manner. In the wake of an economic crisis that has been going on since 2008, with low growth rates, high unemployment[9] and poverty[10], the European project is increasingly being challenged by populations with a sense of downgrading. This is reflected politically by the rapid growth, or even a return to power, of ultra-conservative and far-right nationalist forces. These forces are characterised by not breaking with liberal logic on the national economic level[11], but defending national production against a “transnational elite” while designating population groups (migrants, women, LGBTQI+ people, etc.) as responsible for the global crisis.
In other words, the lack of a joint EU response to Trump’s offensive is primarily political. Some European leaders subscribe to the return of ultra-conservative political leaders, not hesitating to show coercive measures to achieve their ends. Even further: they see Trump and his government as supporters of their own policies. This was particularly striking during the first debate in the European Parliament on Trump’s return to power. Indeed, in January 2025, at the request of the Renew and Socialists and Democrats (S&D) groups, Parliament debated the geopolitical and economic consequences of the new Trump administration on transatlantic relations[12]. The far-right groups in the European Parliament unanimously welcomed the return of D. Trump to power, Jordan Bardella, president of the Patriots for Europe group, even saw it as an “Alliance of the middle classes and the entrepreneurial elite“. In the “centre”, the liberals are fairly measured on this political change, except for the head of the French delegation, Valérie Hayer, who, following E. Macron’s speech, insists on the need to build a balance of power to face “a trade war in which Europe and the United States would have no interest“. In concrete terms, the parties of the “coalition” – European People’s Party (EPP), S&D and Renew – agree on three things:
- Continuing to invest in the “defence of Ukraine”, including by strengthening European defence in parallel or in complementarity with NATO
- Strengthening the internal market and thus working towards greater federalisation of the European Union
- Continuing to strengthen the transatlantic partnership while calling for multilateralism.
It should be noted that the S&D group, supported by some of the liberals (the French) and the Left group, also calls for the implementation of anti-coercion measures[13].
Among the groups that represent governmental forces (except the extreme right, which shares the political project supported by D. Trump), one might wonder why there is not unanimity to face the measures taken by the United States against Europe. These differences are also expressed at the level of the European Council meetings that have been held since. Until very recently, European leaders, with some exceptions, remained fairly silent in the face of the aggressiveness of the United States. The transatlantic partnership is never called into question. And for good reason: in addition to political divisions, there are divergent interests from a national economic point of view.
Not all countries across the EU have the same interests or the same economic and industrial situation. On 5 February 2025, the Gabriel Péri Foundation organised the first part of the Transatlantic Chronicles on the Return of D. Trump: what will be the consequences for Europe and the world?[14] During this seminar, journalist Natacha Polony insisted that “in this trade war, Europeans are in disarray, because they do not have the same interests. The German model is failing and Germany wants to avoid the trade war at all costs, because its economy is extremely intertwined with that of the United States“.
Indeed, in 2024, the United States was the EU’s largest partner for exports of goods (20.6%) and its second partner for imports of goods (13.7%), behind China (21.3%). But not all countries are equal: 20 of the 27 EU Member States had a trade surplus with the United States, in terms of trade in goods. At the top of the list is Germany, with a trade surplus of 92 billion euros, followed by Ireland (51 billion euros) and Italy (39 billion euros)[15]. Conversely, the Netherlands is the EU country that imports the most from the United States: 25 billion euros in 2024 for goods alone. These two countries with different economic realities are totally dependent on the United States and have no interest in building a balance of power vis-à-vis Washington or in moving further towards a true “strategic autonomy“[16]. Conversely, a country like France, which has suffered the full brunt of deindustrialisation in recent years, is in the middle of European countries, with a trade surplus of 3 billion euros in 2024 vis-à-vis the United States. It has an objective interest in moving away from US tutelage. However, French diplomacy, which has become considerably weaker, is far from being widely convincing nowadays in Europe.
Indeed, the essential question to face this new phase of the trade war is that of the industrial revival and the capacities of the countries of the European Union to be “sovereign” or at least “autonomous” in sectors essential to the economy and development, in particular in terms of food, digital, energy, monetary or military. These are all sectors in which the United States intends to maintain its dominance.
An industrial revival put forward as a priority by the European Commission, but to the test of contradictions
The aggressiveness of the world’s leading industrial power is not new. Indeed, the extraterritorial nature of US law has been[17] constraining companies for years and has led to aggressive buybacks against some large European companies[18]. In this context, the question of industrial recovery is central to avoiding the inevitable decline of Europe, on which the United States is betting to maintain its hegemony.
In September 2025, the Draghi report[19], named after the former president of the Central Bank, was released on the future of European competitiveness. Since then, this report has been the subject of much discussion at European level. It is being touted as the solution by a coalition ranging from the Social Democrats to the Liberals, including the majority of the Greens and part of the traditional right at the European level. It notes the industrial decline of the European Union due to the lack of massive investments in industry, research and innovation. In addition, the report points to “structural problems related to the European energy market and low investment in infrastructure” and finally “dependencies mainly concerning critical materials and technological resources such as semiconductors“. The report highlights the need for massive investments, which the report estimates at 750–800 billion euros each year, to reindustrialise Europe and strengthen energy security in particular. It also advocates “the completion of the capital markets union and the launch of a common debt“, in other words, a move towards greater federalism within the European Union, where “governance” would be further shifted from the national level to the Union level.
Since then, the Commission has taken several measures in industrial terms. Of particular note is the publication on 26 February 2025 of the Clean Industrial Deal, aimed at supporting the competitiveness of European industries while accelerating their decarbonisation. This plan, which is expected to mobilise €100 billion for clean technologies and energy-intensive industries, also proposes structural reforms to “reduce bureaucracy” and ensure a sustainable supply of critical raw materials[20]. Specific measures concerning the automotive industry in particular were also set out on 5 March 2025,[21] and others concerning the steel sector at the end of March 2025[22].
In addition to these measures, the European Union is relying on its industrial defence strategy presented in March 2024 and giving rise to the publication of a white paper on European defence, presented by the Commission on 19 March 2025[23]. The related “RearmEurope” programme entails spending of more than 800 billion euros in order to “support the European defence industry by pooling demand” and to “deepen the defence market at EU level“.
In other words, in a context of an increasingly globalised trade war, the European Union is opting for a war economy, a strengthening of market mechanisms and ever-increasing federalisation at a time when the European integration project has never been more in question. If the novelty lies in the massive investments sought at the level of the Union, these will serve to strengthen an integration project anchored in the neoliberal doctrine of competition and a public power at the service of large private sectors of the economy. In this respect, the project differs little from what the Trump administration intends to do for the United States.
What alternative policy could Europe pursue?
However, the question could be asked differently: how could the revival of industrial production in Europe be beneficial to the people of Europe, to human development and to ecological transition? In this, the objective is no longer “the completion of the capital market“, but rather how to regain control of production to put it at the service of the people.
This would mean, for example, aiming for sovereignty in food or energy so as to no longer be dependent on external powers.Massive subsidies from the European Union could be used to renationalise key sectors of the economy to meet human and ecological needs. Cooperation between European countries could be achieved to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 with the establishment of large public energy hubs to get out of fossil fuels, price volatility and energy poverty on a global scale.
In other words, neoliberal politics is not a dogma from which we cannot emancipate ourselves. Other countries are making contrary choices. After thirty years of privatisation, Britain, for example, decided in November 2024 to renationalise the rail sector, after renationalising part of its electricity network in 2022.
In the same way, achieving true “strategic autonomy” for the European Union inevitably involves questioning the transatlantic partnership and alignment – or even submission – to the United States. In this respect, the remoteness of the decision-making centres, as well as the disinvestment of the States from their most sovereign powers (security and defence in particular), offer no guarantee of remedying the industrial crisis, the growing mistrust of the European institutions, or the growing tensions on a continental and global scale.
Asking the question of the purpose of public policies is tantamount to asking the question of who they serve: workers and populations, or large private groups and shareholders. In the same way, to ask the question of the purpose of production is to ask the question of the political priority that we set ourselves: to respond to human and ecological transition needs or to conquer new markets. Bringing an alternative and social voice to the two pitfalls of nationalism and the federalist headlong rush is a central challenge for the forces of social transformation. It is also a necessity to conquer the “peace and prosperity” so often promised by EU leaders.
Charlotte Balavoine is the secretary of the Gabriel Péri Foundation and political advisor to the European Parliament from 2010 to 2024.
This article was firstly published in the article collection of ENoP The EU amidst
global shifts Navigating the path to democracy in unstable times : https://www.enop.eu/publications/the-eu-amidst-global-shifts-navigating-the-path-to-democracy-in-unstable-times/
The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung is a member of ENoP.
[1]The full joint statement is available on the European Commission’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/statement_23_5198
[2]This is all the more seen as a danger that Western countries have advocated for thirty years the disinvestment of the State, especially in the industrial and economic sphere, while China has developed a commercial and industrial approach of the State to the trade of “strategic” materials with a mastery of the production chain, planning and an upscaling allowing it to overtake Western countries. While internally the country has a lot of resources, externally, massive investments in Africa in particular have allowed it to hold 90% of the world’s rare earth production, as well as 80% of tungsten production. Beijing is therefore selling increasingly processed products with higher added value. Ultimately, its strategy extends to finished products, allowing it to be at the forefront of the renewable energy and electric mobility markets.
[3]“Rare earths and strategic minerals in Ukraine”, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 19 February 2025. https://unric.org/fr/terres-rares-et-mineraux-strategiques-en-ukraine/
[4] Seb Starcevic, “EU offers its own “win-win” minerals deal to Ukraine”, Politico, 25 February 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/critical-minerals-rare-earths-deal-eu-not-donald-trump/
[5] ‘The EU and Greenland sign a strategic partnership on sustainable raw material value chains’, press release, European Commission, 30 November 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_23_6166
[6]For more information on the link between critical raw materials and the ecological transition, read volume 30-2023/1 of Alternatives Sud on the “green” transition and “critical” metals published in May 2023 https://www.cetri.be/Transition-verte-et-metaux; Christophe Poinssot, “Les métaux stratégiques: le nouveau défi de la transition énergétique”, proceedings of the symposium, L’énergie: bien commun de l’humanité? Gabriel Péri Foundation, March 2024. https://gabrielperi.fr/librairie/notes-actes/lenergie-bien-commun-de-lhumanite/
[7] Charlotte Balavoine, “Les minerais rares: indépendance ou entrée en guerre froide?”, La Pensée magazine no. 417, January–March 2024. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-la-pensee-2024-1-page-30?lang=fr
[8] L’Humanité magazine no. 945 of 13 March 2025. https://kiosque.humanite.fr/detail/publication/detail-top-right/17/l-humanite-magazine-945?issue_id=207486&switch_toc=archive
[9] Eurostat estimates that 12.978 million people in the EU, including 10.830 million in the eurozone, were unemployed in December 2024.
[10] Eurostat estimates that one in ten Europeans live below their country’s poverty line. This proportion varies from one to three, from 5% in Finland and the Czech Republic to 16% in Bulgaria. Between 50 and 125 million people in the EU live in extreme poverty and do not have access to electricity.
[11] It is not a question for these forces of strengthening public services, for example, but rather of defending a specific fringe of the economy: national companies while putting the resources of the State at their service so that these companies are more competitive on an international scale, while advocating a distinction in legal terms and rights between national and immigrant workers.
[12] Full report of the debates, 21 June 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-01-21-ITM-008_FR.html
[13] Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 on the protection of the Union and its Member States against economic coercion by third countries of 22 November 2023, initially adopted to counter the ambitions of Chinese investors in certain EU countries. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/fr/LSU/?uri=oj:L_202302675#:~:text=QUEL%20EST%20L’OBJET%20DE,membre%20de%20l’UE). Theoretical measures that could be applied to the third country in response to economic coercion include the imposition of trade restrictions, for example in the form of increased customs duties, import or export licences, or restrictions in the field of services or public procurement.
[14] https://gabrielperi.fr/initiatives/chroniques-transatlantiques/
[15] Eurostat Data.
[16] To compensate for the lack of efficiency at the international level and the difficulties of supply at the European level, a new rhetoric has been built around “strategic autonomy”, a central axis of the European Commission’s communication in recent years, supposed to reflect its geopolitical turn. This notion appeared for the first time in the Council’s conclusions on the European defence industry in 2013, and gradually expanded to economic issues under the influence of the French Presidency of the EU in 2017. It has since been directly associated with the EU’s external policies, and in particular with trade policy and industrial recovery.
[17] To cite just one example, the Itar (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is a US regulation that controls the manufacture, sale and distribution of defence and space-related objects and services, as defined in the USML (United States Munitions List). The extraterritoriality of US laws obliges any non-US industrialist to comply with them, as long as they manage the supply and re-export of products subject to Itar or EAR (Export Administration Regulations). This results in dependence, pressure and even fines that can heavily penalise European companies.
[18] An emblematic example is the sale of Alstom’s energy branch to General Electric following pressure, including the arrests of some of these leaders, such as Frédéric Pierucci, who recounts his experience of fourteen months spent in prison in the book Le Piège américain. Les Dessous de l’affaire Alstom. Éditions Lattès, 2019.
[19] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en
[20] The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 26 February 2025.
[21] “Stimulating the European automotive sector”, European Commission, 5 March 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/business-and-industry/boosting-european-car-sector_fr
[22] Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, A European Steel and Metals Action Plan, European Commission, 19 March 2025 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metals-action-plan_en?prefLang=fr
[23] “Commission unveils White Paper on European Defence and ‘ReArm Europe’ plan/Preparing for 2030”, press release, European Commission, 19 March 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_25_793